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PRIVATIZATION OF SPACE VENTURES: PROPOSING A 
PROVEN REGULATORY THEORY FOR FUTURE 
EXTRATERRESTRIAL ApPROPRIATION 
l. INTRODUCTION 
SpaceShipOne secured its place in history in late 2004 as the first 
commercially developed aircraft to enter outer space when it soared, for the 
second time within a week, to an altitude of more than one hundred kilometers. l 
Aerospace pioneer Burt Rutan designed and built SpaceShipOne to compete for 
the Ansari X Prize, a ten million dollar purse awarded to the first team to pilot a 
privately built vehicle to an altitude of one hundred kilometers twice within two 
weeks." If the aircraft and its capabilities were not impressive enough, Ruton 
built SpaceShipOne for approximately twenty million dollars-a bargain 
compared to NASA built vehicles.' 
Shortly after SpaceShipOne captured the Ansari X prize, Virgin Atlantic 
licensed the technology for a new enterprise called "Virgin Galactic."4 Within 
five years, Virgin Galactic plans to offer flights to outer space at the price of two-
hundred thousand dollars per passenger.5 
1 Leonard Da\'id, ,)j!(lc(!Slllj)()"" If/'lls S 10 ivfillioll AlISari X Pri::{! ill lIistoric 211t! Trip to SPIICC, 
SPACF,COM, Oct. 4, 2004, http://www.spaec.conllmissionlaul1ches/xprize2 success 041004.html (last visited 
Apr. 13,2(05) [hereinafter SpaceSitipOIl(,]. 
2 Sc(' SI}(/C('SllljJOIIC, Slipi'll 110te I. 
3 Robert Roy Britt, NAS.1 Plalls Casit Pri::cs ill Wake! ofSIJace!SitipOllc SIICC(,SS, SPACE.COM, June 
23, 2004, http://www.spaee.eolllinewsinasa prizes 040623.htllll (last visited Apr. 13, 20(5). 
4 It!, 
5 Virgill Gaillctic to Of",r Pllhlic Sjwcc Fligitts. SPAtE.COM, Sept. 27. 2004, http://www.spaee.eomi 
missioniaunches/virgin spaee 040927.htmi (last visited Apr. 13,2(05) [hereinafter Vi/gilt Ga/llctic]. 
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Bigelow Aerospace recently announced a competition similar to the 
Ansari X Prize-a fifty million dollar purse to be awarded to the first team to 
design and build a spacecraft capable of docking with an inflatable space station 
orbiting 160 kilometers above the earth's surface. 6 The company purchased the 
technology and patent rights to the inflatable space station from NASA, which 
did not have the funding to continue research and development. When Bigelow 
finishes what NASA could not, it will have a space station that will weigh only 
20,000 to 23,000 kilograms and intlate to 13.7 meters long and 6.7 meters in 
diameter. 7 Bigelow Aerospace plans to usc the station for commercial purposes 
such as research, tourism, and industrial production. x NASA itself also plans to 
join in the prize incentive development game started by private industry. 
Although NASA is a government entity, it has also decided to encourage private 
space ventures by planning to offer cash prizes as high as thirty million dollars.9 
NASA plans to award projects capable of a wide variety of tasks, from orbiting 
the earth to collecting moon rocks. IO Although not an exhaustive list, these 
examples are sufficient to illustrate how privately funded ventures into space are 
not only becoming practicable but more importantly, profitable. Many companies 
envision the enormous commercial demand that access to space may bring. I I 
(, Tariq Malik. Ni'll' S50 Ali/lioll I'ri~e fiJi' I'ri"lIte Orhitillg .'>iJilu!cmfi. SPA.l'Ll'OM. Sept. 27. 2004. 
http://www.space.col11il11issionlaunches/bigclowspaceprizc040927.html( last visited Apr. 13. 20(5). 
7 Leonard David. Bige/o\\' .1el"Oslwce to Tack/e /Ilf/OW"/C SiJilcC I/llhita/s. SPAlL-COM. May 24. 2004 
htlp://www.spacc.coll1/newsibusincssll1onuay 040S24.htll1l (last visited Apr. 13. 20(5) I hcreinattcr Space 
Habitatsj. 
X Ill. 
9 See Britt, supra note 3 (explaining that the legislation for NASA's proposal is pending in Congress) 
10 John F. Schuessler, Prir'ate Sector 11I1'II/r'elll<'lIt ill the Siwc£' I'rogmlll: SOllie Thillgs to COllsida 
(May 200 I). htlp:l/www.bigc!owacrospucc.col11lschucsslcr-pvt-scclor.doc (last \'isilCd Apr. 13. 200S). 
II Id. 
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Issue 1 Privatization olSpace Ventures 
Although space tourism enjoys the most publication, incrcased space access also 
has the potential to benefit other commercial applications as well. 12 
The government alone, through programs and entities like NASA, cannot 
satisfy the commercial demands for space-related activities. Until recently the 
Columbia shuttle disaster caused NASA to ground its entire shuttle fleet. U Given 
the mismatch between government supply and commercial demand, privately 
funded ventures offer a golden key to unlocking the vast potential of space 
related commerce. 
Unfortunately, current international space conventions are a roadblock to 
privatization of space activity. These conventions impose restraints on the 
development, alienability, and appropriation of outer spacc. These conventions 
ignore the realities of our ultra-competitive capitalistic global society where 
some corporations enjoy larger annual revenues than the gross national product 
of many small countries. Rather, it seems these conventions were formulated for 
an idealistic world that has yet to materialize. Although idealism has its place, the 
international community must develop laws governing space appropriation. 
Moreover, the development of such laws must utilize established principles of 
property law, capitalism,14 and equity. 
12 !d Bristol-Myers Squibb, fi)r example. has fillllld that rroduction rates for the cancer fighting 
antibiotic actinomycin [) arc 75",j, faster in space than on earth. Additionally, research has shown that growing 
semiconductor crystals in sracc yiclds crystals of llluch higher quality than thosc grown on Earth. These 
supcrior crystals have the potential to greatly imrrove arplications utilizing eomruter chips. !d. 
13 Tariq Malik. iVAS.·j Pre"lIre., fiJI' FlIfll/"(! Risk, CNN.(OM, Oct. 29, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/ 
2004,TECIVspacc i I O!29/nasa.risk/indcx.html (last visited Apr. 13. 2005 I. 
14 The terms "capitalist" and .. tree market" arc used here interchangeably. By so doing, there is no 
intent to suggest a illisse:-jili!"e outer space economy with little or no governmental restraints. Rather, I refer to 
the devclopment of the current capitalist structure that entails illfer alill, mass import and exror!. frec trade or 
low tariff trade. traditional property jurisprudence. reliance on contract law, privatization of industry, and 
regulatory governmental controls. 
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Although the establishment of a body of space law ("corpus jllris 
,\patialis") for outer spaee appropriation may seem premature, it is not. Justice 
William Brennan, Jr. of the United States Supreme Court observed, "I won't see 
the day when a code of laws for space communities will become an urgent 
necessity. Perhaps few of you may sec that day. But we can be glad that respon-
sible quarters are beginning to give thought to the law and space communities."15 
Indeed, now is the time to lay a solid foundation for the laws that will eventually 
govern outer space. 
This note addresses the current treaties' inadequacies to accommodate 
the increased privatization of outer space venture, and the limited role of states. 
The current body of space law, on which these treaties are based, is flawed 
because it relies on a philosophy of common ownership ("res ('o/lll11ll11is"). While 
res comlllunis exists as an important intellectual idea for philosophical debate, it 
is incongruent with the market conditions that will facilitate appropriation of 
celestial bodies. Ultimately, states must abandon these treaties based on res 
C01llfllUilis because of their inability to work in tandem with the emerging realities 
of privately funded extraterrestrial appropriation and expansion. In short, the 
international community must find a new framework for CO/PllS jllris ,\patia/is 
that will encourage and facilitate appropriation activities in outer space. 
15 Lawrence L. Risley. All FWlllilllllioll o/Ihe Need 10 AIlli!//(/5j)({ce L(/)\' 10 Pmleel II", Pril'ale 
Exp/orer ill Oilier Space. 26 W. Sl. U. L. Rl\. 47. 67 (1999) (quoting William .I. Brennan. Jr .. Space 
C%lliallioll alld Ihe Lall', 3 HAR\, . .l.L. & TH'II. 7. 12 (1990)), 
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As an alternative to the current corpus juris spatialis based on res 
COI11I11 1111 is, this note proposes a corplls jllris spatia/is derived fr0111 property 
jurisprudence that has effectively and efficiently worked under the pressures of 
an international market over the past millennia. Under this proposed cOI]Jllsjuris 
,\patialis a posteriori,16 extraterrestrial acquisition and appropriation would 
require three clements: (1) discovery; (2) claim; and (3) possession. 
Under this new corplls juris spatialis a natural or juridical person could 
meet the requirements for sufficient discovery, by acquiring a charter from a 
granting state. Both developed and developing states would negotiate these 
charters based on their respective needs and obligations, and would abide by 
bilateral and multilateral treaties designed to ensure appropriate environmental 
and humanitarian standards. In order to make a claim, a state would put the rest 
of the world on sufficient notice of the state's intent to acquire land. Satisfaction 
of the first two requirements, discovcry and claim, would create an inchoate title 
that would then be perfected by possession, which would consist of sovereign 
acts for a prescriptive period. These formulated requirements, based in part on 
norms that governed the Age of Discovery, possess a foundation of realistic 
notions of humankind's demonstrated self-interest; yet they provide an ordered 
and equitable means of extraterrestrial appropriation and distribution to both 
developed and developing countries. 
1 hAdrian Copiz, 5;ca/"cit\, ill 'simcl': Till' 11I(l'rllatiolla/ R('gll/alioll of Satl'lIil('.I', 1 0 C()\1ML~\\ 
CO'lSPfLTIIS 207, 21 X 23 (2002) 
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II. FAILURES OF TilE OUTER SPACE TREATY, MOON TREATY, AND RES 
COJfMUNlS DOGMA 
Both the Outer Space!7 and Moon Treaties!X arose out of the ideal 
common heritage of mankind ("CHM") principle.!Y The CHM concept states that 
no one person or state owns designated international "common heritage" 
regions.20 Accordingly, the international community manages and administers 
designated areas pursuant to international agreements. 21 Therefore, state 
sovereignty, including its attendant powers, beneiits, and responsibilities, 
remains non-cxistcnt in these areas. 22 Generally, the CHM principle adhercs to 
the following: "( I) thc common hcritage arca is not subject to appropriation; (2) 
all states share in the area's resource managcmcnt; (3) statcs must share the 
benefits derived from cxploitation of area resources; and (4) the common 
heritage area must be dedicated to peaceful purposes exelusivcly."23 
The Outcr Space Treaty, although not expressly incorporating the CHM 
principle, clearly entails CHM application because it disallows state appropri-
17 Treaty on Principles Governing thc Activitics of Stales in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, "I'elled 10,. sigllol",.e Jan. 27, I <)(,7, 18 U.S.T. 2410,610 
U.N.T.S.205 Ihereinatler Outer Space Treatyl. 
18 Agreement Governing the Activities of the States on the Moon and other Celestial Hodies, opmed 
!iJl' sigllalllr(' Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. Jlhcreinailer Moon Treatyl. 
19 S'ee gel/i!ralh' Jennifer Frakes, Note, The C 'OIiIl/1011 Ilerilage 01 Mallkilld P,.illciple ({lid Ihe D(,l!p 
S(,(I"('(I. Ollll!" Sj}([c(', alld Allla,.clica: lVill Dn'l!lop('(1 (1//(1 /}n'elopillg Naliolls Rc({ch a ('oll/proll/ise:), 21 WIS. 
IN \'\. L..1. 409, 42125 (2003); Eric Husby, So 1'ereiglltl , (///d l'rojiertl' Rig/IlS ill Oilier 5/)(/('1!, 3 n.eL. 1. INT'L 
L. & PRAl . 359, 366 70 ( 1994); Harminderpal Singh Rana, Note, Thl! "( '011/11/011 Ilerilage 01 Mallkiwl" & The 
Filial Frolllier: A Rcm/llalioll oj I ,i/III!S CO/l.l/illllillg Ih" I1llel"l/(/liO//(/1 Legal Regill/e lor O"ler Simce ACli1'ilies, 
26 Rli fl;t,RS L..I. 225, 228 31 (1994): Kelly M. Zullo, No!e, Th" N""d 10 C/al"l/l/hl! Slallls o(Proper/l' Righls 
ill lllier//(/liollol Spacl! LOll', 90 CiF(). L.J. 2413,2423 (2()02). 
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11 SI!I! id. 
22 SI'I! id. 
23 Id. at 229 30. 
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ation and designates celestial bodies for scientific and peaceful purposes. 24 The 
Moon Treaty, bolder in its approach, expressly designates the moon and its 
resources as "common heritage of all mankind."25 
Although useful in philosophical discussion, res comll1unis ideology 
encounters significant problems when it leaves the philosophical and enters into 
the post-cold war era. Res communis only exists in reality within narrowly-
defined subgroups that make a poor analogy to the complex international 
dynamics of outer space appropriation. This note seeks to demonstrate that a 
24 Outer Space Treaty. ,I'llI'm note 17. art. I. That article provides: 
The exploration and use of outer space. including the moon and 
other celestial bodies. shall be carried out for the benctit and in the 
interests of all countries. irrespective of their degree of economic 
or scientilic development. and shall be the province of all 
mankind. Outer space. including the moon and other eeicstial 
bodies. shall be free /()r exploration and usc by all States without 
discrimination of any kind. on a basis of equality and in 
accordance with international law. and there shall be li'ee access to 
all areas of celestial bodies. There shall be freedom of scientilic 
investigation in outer space. including the moon and other celestial 
bodies. and States shall lacilitate and encourage international co-
operation in such investigation. 
25 Moon Treaty. ,I'llI'm note I X. arts. 6. II (I). Article II (I) of the Moon Treaty provides: "'The moon 
and its natural resources arc the common heritage of mankind." Article 6 states: 
I. There shall be fi'eedom of scientific investigation on the l1100n 
by all States Parties without discrimination of any kind. on the 
basis of equality and in accordance with international law. 
2. In carrying out seientilic investigations and in furtherance of the 
provisions of this Agreement. the States Parties shall have the right 
to colicct on and remove Irom the 11100n S<lInplcs of its mineral and 
other substances. Sueh samples shall remain at the disposal of 
those States Parties whieh caused them to be collected and may be 
used by them for scientilic purposes. States Parties shall have 
regard to the desirability of making a rortion of such samrles 
available to other interested States Parties and the international 
scientilic community II)r scicntilic investigation. Statcs Parties 
may in the course of scientific investigations also usc mineral and 
other substances of the moon in quantities appropriate for the 
surport of their missions. 
3. States Parties agree on the desirability of exchanging scientilic 
and other personnel on expeditions to or im,tallations on the moon 
to the greatest extent feasible and practicable. 
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complcte non-owncrship ("res l1ullius") approach to property cndowment would 
avoid many of the philosophical quandaries of future outer space appropriation. 
A. The Outer Space Treaty 
The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 was developed under intcmational 
political, economic, and social conditions that were vastly different from what 
they are today.26 Russia launched Sputnik one year prior to the formation of the 
United Nation's committee that drafted the Outer Space Treaty.n Strong 
centralized govemments carried out space activities to prove their technological 
superiority over rival nations without any realizable profit and without any 
feasibility of exploiting celestial bodies in outer space. At the time, private 
companies nevcr planned on creating an orbiting hotel or timeshare, or providing 
commercial excursions into outer space, nor did they contemplate building 
spacecraft, space rockets, or even satellites. Even the imagined privatization of 
space failed to materialize in any meaningful way.2S 
Undcr these circumstances, the Outer Space Treaty was ratified by more 
than ninety nations and signed by twenty-seven, including the United States. 29 
Owing to its overwhelming support in the intemational community, many 
consider the Outcr Space Treaty international space law. JO 
The Outer Space Treaty explicitly forbids the appropriation of celestial 
bodies, even by a developed country funding the majority of space exploration 
198 
26 Sic''' Frakes, SlIl'ril note 19. at 421. 
27 !d. at 422. 
n Sel! iii. at 421; Zullo, Slipril note 19. at 2416 IX. 
29 s"t! Frakes, S/ll'ril note 19, at 421. 
30 St!" Zullo, slIpra note 19, at 2418. 
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and discovery, as follows: "Outer space, including the moon and other celestial 
bodies, is not suhject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means 
of use or occupation, or by any other means."11 In connection with this, the Outer 
Space Treaty does not recognize a right to exclude others from appropriated 
property: 
Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall 
be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimi-
nation of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with 
international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of 
celestial bodies. 12 
The Treaty mandates that 
[t]he exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and 
other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in 
the interest of all countries, irrespective of their degree of 
economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of 
all mankind." 
Under this language, developed nations, which provide the majority of 
funding for space exploration, will realize the same pecuniary benefit as those 
countries that make no investment in spaee exploration whatsoever. Interestingly, 
some developed countries have since interpreted the provisions of the Outer 
Space Treaty to limit or defeat its purpose. 14 For example, when the United States 
ratified the Outer Space Treaty, it interpreted the anti-appropriation clause 
loosely: "[T]he understanding of the Committee on Foreign Relations [is] that 
nothing in Article I diminishes or alters the right ofthe United States to determine 
31 It!. art. 2. 
32 Outer Spaee Treaty . . '''Jim note 17. art. I. 
33 Iii. 
34 1d. 
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how ... it shares the benefits and results of its spaee aetivities.":15 This sort of 
loose interpretation could allow for appropriation of celestial bodies at the 
exclusion of others. 
The majority of scholars agree that the Outer Space Treaty and the anti-
appropriation clause apply to both public and private entities.:1I' First, the Outer 
Space Treaty ensures "free access to all areas of celestial bodies."37 
Appropriation activities by corporations or individuals, in addition to those by 
states, would violate the treaty because appropriation would naturally exclude 
others from enjoying free access to all areas of the celestial body.3x FurthenTIore, 
ample evidence reveals that the drafters intended to include private persons and ~ 
corporations when, in Article 2, they forbade appropriation "by any other 
means".19 This catch-all phrase is widely inteq1reted to mean that states cannot 
usc other entities to exploit extraterrestrial bodies simply because juridical and 
natural persons may constitute a viable "means" of the state . .JO 
B. The Moon Treat)' 
Thirteen years after the signing of the Outer Space Treaty, the interna-
tional community drafted the Moon Treaty in an attempt to further specify the 
role that states should play in the exploration and use of celestial bodies. The 
proposed Moon Treaty, based on many of the same principles as the Outer Space 
35 Husby. slipra notc 19. at 364 (quoting Nandasuri Jascntuliyana . . Ir[ie/" I of [he (Jill('/" Space 
Treal)' Re)'i.liled. 17 J. SPAll: L. 129. 139 (19X9)). 
36 See, e.g .• Zullo, SlIllI'a notc 19, at 2420; Heidi Keefe, Note, Alakillg Ihe Filla/ Frolllier Fcavih/e: 
.~ ('rili('({1 Look al the Currell[ 8m'" of Oll[er -"j",ee Lall'. II s.\" 1 \ ('I ,\1<.\ C"~dl'l, II I< & HI(dl 1'11'11. L..I. 345. 
35X59 (1995). 
37 Outer Space Treaty, slIl,m note 17, art. I. 
3g Zullo, slIpra flote 19, at 2420. 
39 Kecfe, .I'llI'm note 36, at 359. 
40/d. COlltm Stephcn (jorovc. IlItelj,re/illg .Ir/ide /I of the Oilier .\j",('e n'eall', 37 1-<)1<1)11.\\1 L. 
RI.y. 349, 351 (1969). 
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Treaty, did not enjoy the same overwhelming support..) I The Treaty has been open 
for ratification since December 18, 1979, yet only ten countries to date have 
ratified it (not including the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, 
or Japan) . .)" The Moon Treaty, in many ways, puts into action the ideals of the 
Outer Space Treaty. It declares that the Moon and its resources arc the "common 
heritage of mankind"41 and establishes a regulatory regime to ensure that states 
obey this provision.4-1 Many commentators have interpreted the Moon Treaty as 
a moratorium on space exploration until the regulatory regime's instatement.45 
The Moon Treaty prohibits national appropriation in the same manner as 
the Outer Space Treaty: 
The Moon is not subject to national appropriation by any claim 
of sovereignty, by means of usc or occupation, or by any other 
means. Neither the surface nor the subsurface of the moon, nor 
any part thereof or natural resources in place, shall become 
property of any State, international intergovernmental or non-
governmental organization, national organization or non-govern-
mental entity or of any natural person. 46 
41 Zullo. supra note 19. at 2423. 
42 OFFice FOR OUTLR SIWI' AIIAIRS, UNITEil N.\1I0NS OFFICI- AI VIE'I'IA. A(iR1TMEI'o:T CiOVFRNING 
rHo ACTI\HIf,S OF SIMI'S ON IHL MOON ANIl OIHU{ CiI.FSTML BOIlII,S, (/1 http://www.oosa.unvicnnu.org/ 
SpaceLaw/moon.html (last vi,itcd Apr. 13, 2()05) (,howing that the treaty has hccn ratilicd hy Morocco. 
Pakistan, Nctherlands, Mexico, Uruguay, Philippincs, Kazakhstan, Chile, Australia, and Austria. The signatories 
to the treaty arc: India, Peru, Romania, Francc, and Guatemala). 
43 Moon Treaty. slIlira note I X, art. I I. For an cxccllcnt discussion of "Pr()\ incc of All Mankind" 
sec David Tan, linl'lIrds (/ N"I\' Regilile liJl'liI" I'rolrclioll o/Oul"r Sj)(lC(! liS liIe 'Pml'illce 01 AI! M(/Ilkilld. "25 
YAI F J. l'Il'L L. 145, 159 165 (2000). 
44 SI!I! id. paras. 4 5. Thc Moon Trcaty provides: 
4. States Partics have the right to exploration and use of the moon without discrimination 
of any kind, on thc hasis of equality and in accordance with intcrnational law and the 
terms of this Agrccmcnt. 
5. Statcs Parties to this Agrecment hcrehy undertakc to estahlish an internatiOlwl regimc, 
including appropriate procedures, to govern the exploitation of the natural resources of 
the moon as ~lIch exploitation i~ about to become feasible. This provision shall be 
implemcnted in accordancc with article I X of this Agrcemcnt. 
45 S"" Lynn M. Fountain, Notc, Creillillg MO/ll,,"I{1I1 i11 Space: /,'{ulillg Ill<' I'ora/t'sis Pmdllccd hI' 
liIe "CO/ll/l1011 flcriloge o(Mullki11d" !Joelrilll!, 35 CONN. L. RI\·. 1753, 1764 (2003). 
46 Moon Treaty. slIlira notc I X, art. II. 
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The wording is strikingly similar to the Outer Space Treaty: 
The exploration and use of the moon shall be the provincc of all 
mankind and shall be can'ied out for the benefit and in the 
interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic 
or scientific development. 47 
Again, regardless of the individual contributions ofa statc to the cstablishmcnt of 
spacc exploration or celestial appropriation, undcr thc Moon Treaty a noncon-
tributing state will receive a bcncfit and an intcrcst. The rcasoning for such a non-
reciprocal arrangement seems to be a desire to pay "[ d]ue regard ... to the 
interests of present and future generations" and the "need to promote higher 
standards of living and conditions of economic and social progress and 
development. . . . "4X 
An obvious question persists: Why would the United Statcs and other 
nations refuse to ratify or even sign the Moon Treaty when it consisted of similar 
principles as the Outer Spaee Treaty, which received worldwide support and 
ratification just thirteen years earlier? The answer lies in the shortcomings and 
impracticability of the Moon and Outer Space treaties. Spccifically, the answer 
lics in the fact that states simply did not agrec with the philosophical principle of 
res comlllunis on which they arc based. 
C. The Cllrrenl Corpus Juris Spatial is: Shortcomings and 
In/practicability 
The res communis principle cmbedded In the current corpus juris 
.spatialis will fail for three reasons. First, it is not the way sovereign states have 
historically used newly discovered property. Second, it violates our current 
202 
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Issue 1 Privatization oj'Space Ventures 
notions of property jurisprudence and it goes against our current capitalist 
methods of conducting international relations in a free-market global economy. 
Third, human beings may never be able to live by this idealistic principle in the 
future; there is little to suggest that it is in our human nature to do so. 
Although humankind lived in communal societies in the past, communal 
living no longer plays a broad role in today's global society. Examples of 
successful communal living for substantial periods of time have generally been 
limited to small aboriginal groupS.49 Recent attempts at communal living in the 
United States have likewise been small in scale, but also short-lived. 511 Twentieth 
century attempts to apply communal living principles on a national scale, such as 
those in China or the Soviet Union, likewise have failed. 51 
Though the res cOl1llllunis principle enjoyed a certain amount of 
popularity in the 1950s and I 960s, the res cOll1l11unis principle had limited, ifany, 
49 AL,V" P\(;F FISKI. Sll{llClllRFS 01 SOCI,VL Llffc: Till FOLR EU,~H':-iIARY FORMS OF HI'\'IA>; 
RFLAIiONSIIII'S 323 (1991). 
50 For example. in the mid I XOOs. Thc Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints sought to 
cstablish thc idcal Christian utopia and achicvc economic sc1f-sutllcicncy. Bccausc ofperseculion. poverty. and 
disparate wealth among its members. the Church instituted the United Order in the mid-west of the United 
States. All personal and real property was conveyed to the Church. which. in turn. conveyed a "stewardship" to 
the conveyor. Church members also conveyed surpluscs hom their labor to the Church. The surpluses wcre 
then distributed as stewardships to the mcmbcrs of the Church based on their various needs. and to a certain 
extent. wants. The systcm soon tailed duc to perceived incquality and greed whcn distribution occurred. S('(' 
g('/ll!ralil' LFONARIl.l. ARRIN(;tO>;. (jRI'VI BASIN KIN(d)()\I: AN EcONOMIC Hlsr<JRY 01 TIll' LATTFR-DAY SAINfS. 
I R30-1900 ( 195R) Ihcreinafter GReAt BASIN KIN(i[)O~ll; Ll,ONARll .I. ARRIN(iTON. ET AL .• BllLDINCi THE CiTY or 
GOD: COMMUNI fY ANil COOPER,\TlON AVION(i THF MOR\IONS ( 1976). 
More recently. another example of the hlilure of rcv COllllllllllis ideology in application is found in 
the utopian societies prevalent during thc 1960s and 1970s. S(,I! Hl'(ill GARDI'R, THe CfIllIlRFN OF PROSI'I,RIIY: 
THIRIITN MOIlFRN A~lFRICA'i C(}\lMlINI.S 246 (197X). One of the most common factors for thc failure ofthcsc 
systems resulted hom ineffectivc propcrty distribution to contributors and non-contributors alike. TIMOTIIY 
MILLLR. THE 6(h COMMIINI.S: HlpplLS ,VNIl BI'YONIl225 (1999). Many communcs that survived were forced to 
switch from common owner,hip to a trust systcm which inhercd individual property rights in order to maintain 
social viability. Id. at nx. It also appears that communes hequently changed hom common ownership to 
private ownership when the c011lmune's land value increased. 5,'('(' PIWP1RIY RIC;Hrs: COOPI'RAIION. CONFLlCr 
AND LXII 123 ( Terry L. Andcrson & Fred S. McChesncy cds .• 20(3) I hereinafter PROPFRlY RIGII rs I. 
51 Although not a truc res ClJIIIII/I//lis society. pcrhaps one of the most well-known examples of the 
failure of rcv COII//IIIII/is ideology would be thc Sovict Union. Se(' BAII~IAN AZ,Vil. HFROIC S rRII(i(iU,. BITTER 
[)UHI: LVCIORS C()NIRIIl111IN(; 10 1111· DIS\lNHIIN<; m 1111· SOCIALIsr SI.\II' 11\ IHI USSR (20()0). 
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success 111 the past. More importantly, the res cOl11munis principle directly 
conflicts with today's vibrant, free-market, global economy.52 The gap between 
res COII1111Ullis and the current economic mores is best evidenced by the lack of 
support for treaties like the Moon Treaty. 
Nations that refuse to support the Moon Treaty have indicated that 
acceptance of such treaties would be neither equitable nor practical. Treaties 
based on res commltnis principles, such as the Moon Treaty, defy equitable 
principles of distribution because non-contributors arc entitled to the exertion of 
contributors. As the developed nations have progressed in space technology 
development, the exorbitant nature of space exploration costs have become 
increasingly apparent.53 In conjunction, developed nations are increasingly 
reluctant to give the benctits of their expenditures and efforts to developing 
nations without reciprocation or consideration. The United States refused to sign 
or ratify the Moon Treaty and explicitly expressed its hope that its refusal to 
participate in the treaty would '''head otT [the] Third World drive to frustrate 
America's hard-won technological supremacy and to undercut private 
enterprise's ability to develop space resources. "'5-1 
52 Fountain. slIl,m note 45, at 1759. 
53 A recent report by the United Staks President';, Commission on Moon, Mars, and Beyond 
indicated that NASA should change its structure to encourage the private sector in outer space appropriation 
and that NASA should only involve itself where the government is solely qualitlcd. Sce RFPORT OF TIlE 
PRES{{)Et-<T'S COMMISSIOt-< ON Itvipi EME'HA Tl001 OF UNI TI'D S IATFS SPAlE I'Xp{(lRAfION POLllY, A JOURr\EY ro 
INSPIH, I'INOVATI., AND DIS(,(lVI-R (June 20(4), amilahfe al http://www.nasa.gov/pdt!60736main M2M report 
small.pdf (last visited Apr. 13,20(5) I hercinaticr CmIMISSI()'! Rlp(lRll: Michael Coren. While //oll.l'e Re('ei"es 
5j}(fc(' Visioll Reporl: 1''''11.'/ San Prim!e Seclor Will Be C(,lI/nd 10 5j}(f('e /:\/,/omlioll. CNN .cO~1 June 16,2004, 
http://wwlV.cnn.com/2004:TECHispace!06/ 16/ moon.mars.commi"ion.tinaliindex.html (last visited Apr. 13, 
20(5). 
54 Frakes . .I'llI'm note 19, at 425 (quoting S.D. Mau, /:'ljllill·. Ihe Third J",rld alit! Ihe Mooll heal\', 
g SUFFOLK TRA'ISNAJ'1. L. RlV. 221, 2Sg (19~4)). 
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Developed nations arc justified in refusing to participate in inequitable 
treaties regarding the exploration of outer space and the use of its resources. 
Although developing states may contribute to celestial appropriation by offering 
decreased manufacturing and labor costs, these contributions arc not significant 
enough to entitle a state to appropriated materials, or their pecuniary equivalent, 
resulting from business appropriation activities. The developing states receive 
their benefits for providing reduced costs when they get paid for their services. 
Giving developing states a second benefit in thc form of shared ownership of 
celestial bodies or resources discovercd by developed states is contrary to 
established principles of equity in capitalism)" 
Even though capitalistic distribution may seem unfair to the lesser party 
because the entity in the superior position gains the utmost benefit, it will be the 
best principle by which to jump start space exploration and appropriation; res 
COI11I7lWlis, on the other hand, will actually bar its enterprises. Under capitalistic 
principles, each party may benefit difTcrently, but parties receive benefits and 
incentives that push them to develop and produceY' This incentive is destroyed 
when all products arc distributed equally, i.e. to the common heritage of mankind. 
A community ownership theory creates an entitlement for persons who do not 
labor or invest, thus destroying their incentive to produce. Likewise, the producer 
55 Under the Comlllon Heritage Principle. the benetit of outer space exploration and resource 
developlllent attaches twice to developing states. It first attaches upon payment fiJr indirect contribution by 
providing decreased costs in labor and manufacturing. It again attaches upon redistribution of appropriated 
materials hom the common heritage of mankind. If the Outer Space Treaty docs apply to appropriation 
activities. a developing state would be entitled to later-in-time benetits even though its contribution toward them 
was only indirect. See PROPI Rlv RltilIIS. SIII'rt/ note 50. at 122 23. 
S(, See gellcrt/lll" Mil TO'J I'RII IlM.\'J'J. ('APII~I IS~I A~!l FRHIlO\1 t 19(2): .Ioll'J KICJNeTl1 GAl IlR.\1 ell. 
A~tl'RI("AN CAPIIALlSM: TilE CO'JUPI 01 COII'JII'RVI\lt IMi POII!'R (1956). 
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who docs not realize the full benefits of his labor also has a disincentive to 
produce. 
As a practical matter, corporate incentives, rather than govemmental 
mandates, guide society today. 57 Although govemments provide an environment 
wherein business may thrive or die, societal mechanisms have their basis in 
business. Businesses seek lucrative ventures; ifhumankind wishes to appropriate 
space, space appropriation must also be lucrative. 
The current corpllS jllris ,IJ)(tlialis based on res cOllllllunis has received 
wide criticism by legal commentators, in part because of the practical limitations 
of its idealistic principles in application. sx For example, one commentator 
addressing the potential problems of future colonization of celestial bodies 
argued that the prohibition against private and national appropriation may cause 
deleterious effects when colonizers build settlementsY! Although these 
colonizers may occupy the property, they will have no legal control of their 
communities and could be uprooted for the purposes of putting that property to a 
better usc for the benefit of common heritage.(llJ This risk may serve as a strong 
disincentive to the preservation of sectarian colonization in a res commllnis 
society. 
Other commentators argue that the current corpus/llris spatialis based on 
the idealistic res COll1l11lillis principle has actually slowed the development of 
57 See gel/era//)" FR[ID~IAr-; • .I'llI'm note 56; (jAI BRAI III. slIpra note 5f>; JOliN S 11iART MiLl, 
UTI[ IIA[{I'\NI'~I. LI8[RIY, AND RU'RFSI'NJArlVr, G()\ERN~JF\Jlill)4X), 
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59 Keefe, supra note 36 at 366, 
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outer space exploration because privately and publicly funded organizations 
cannot appropriate outer space. 61 Under the current corplIsjllris spatialis, there 
exists no probability or possibility of return on investments,l,2 which results in 
insufficient monetary incentive for businesses or private persons. Even with the 
daunting needs created by increasing population and consumption, and 
decreasing resources on earth, many states may not even attempt to exploit 
extraterrestrial resources because the current corpus juris spatialis does not 
guarantee that their own citizens will benefit from the investments made with 
their tax dollars. A future lack of resources, combined with a body of law that 
mandates common ownership of potential resources, may create a black market 
for extraterrestrial resources, or it may engender armed conflicts over the lack of 
supplies available to states. 63 
While there is little past precedent to justify it, and little present 
sentiment to support it, the current cOI]7l1sjllris spatia/is clings to the idea that in 
the future, humans will be able to share the resources of space in common. One 
commentator illustrates these idealistic ideas and assumptions: 
The articles of the various [outer space J treaties all predicate 
thcmselves upon the theory that mankind will work together for 
the common good with no real advantage to be gained other than 
the praise of his fellow man. It assumes that people are able to 
co-operate, and that they will indeed do so whenever dealing 
with outer space ventures. While the global effort in researching, 
developing and exploring space for the sheer joy of the 
61 Fountain. s/I/}m note 45. at 1756 57. 
62 See it!. 
63 For exampk one reason Japan attacked the United States in 1941 was that Japan lacked metal 
and oil. and the United States refused to supply the Japanese with these commodities. See gellemlll' 2 TilE NEIl' 
E~CY(!()PF[)IA BRIIA"'JI( A I (j()() (15th ed, 2()()3). 
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information obtained, accomplished in the spirit of teamwork is 
a noble goal, it is clear that a world full of economic strife is ripe 
to intervene.64 
These assumptions of the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Treaty are 
unrealistic at present. Perhaps someday humankind will develop ideal character-
istics that the Outer Space Treaty and Moon Treaty would like it to engender. In 
the meantime, it may be impractical to attempt to solvc the dilemma of space 
appropriation based on characteristics yet to be consistently demonstrated. 
Furthermore, res communis principles would become problematic as 
applied to space law due to the following problcms: (1) thc application of res 
communis theory in the Western world has been unsucccssful; and (2) scarcity of 
resources in a res coml11unis socicty is fatalistic to the society. It could be argued 
that the success of res coml11unis ideology, albeit on a small scale, indicates that 
humankind should be able to implement the res cOIll/nwlis ideology.into corpus 
juris ,Ipatia/is. While res communis ideology has seen some success in other 
societies, it is not prudent to assume that it will enjoy the same successful 
application in our increasingly capitalistic, modern society. Societies that have 
successfully implemented res cOll1l11unis ideology have had entirely different 
goals and values systems than those of the capitalist societies that are now 
developing the means for further space exploration.65 While the isolated 
64 Keefe, supra note 36, at 347. 
65 Examples of suecessti.1i utopian living for substantial periods of tillle are generally limited to 
small, aboriginal groups which value cOllllllunal sharing over authority ranking. F1SKL, SIII""" note ..j'J, at 323. 
The values of Western. capitalistic nations that have driven the III to develop the ability to explore space are not 
neee"arily present in groups that successfully live cOllll1lunally. If capitalistic nations were to adopt a res 
COl/lil/llllis ideology, they might do so at the peril of the very values that would drive the III to continue the 
technological adYallcclllcnls that lead to further exploration. 
208 
Issue 1 Privatization o(Space Ventllres 
successes of communal societies in Africa and the Australian Outback are indeed 
admirable, they are certainly not the pioneers of space exploration and appropri-
ation. Furthermore, it is difficult to posit that capitalistic nations can successfully 
switch to a res communis ideology. Groups that originated in capitalistic societies 
and subsequently switched to communal living have ultimately failed and 
reverted back to the individual ownership system from which they came. 66 
The second problem with using res cOl/IlIll/llis as a basis for property 
endowment in outer space law!>7 is the damaging effect of individual appropri-
ation on the community when scarcity ariscs.(,K Even in a res CO 111 111 1 til is society 
where the community owns all property, individual members of the community 
nonetheless usc certain parts of that property to the exclusion of the rest of the 
community.!''! Such individual use and appropriation against the community is 
seen as permissible under a res C0l111111lllis ideology supported by Lockean 
notions of property endowment; an individual may exclude the community from 
property if he or she mixes his or her labor with that propertyJo This individual 
6() See 1\1 iller. SJlpra note 50: PR()I'I R I Y R]( il! r "'. SlI/Jr({ note 50: (JRI'r\ I B \SIi\ KIN(i])()\l, S{{jlra note 
50. 
67 Locke's theory of property endowl11ent has been widely used by advocates and proponents of res 
C(}llIllIlIIlis theory. Husby. SllfJ/'{/ note 19. at .169 ("The view of the opponents of the Moon Treaty lind an 
expression of the principle of res cOl11l11unis in the writings of Locke and Rousscau."). Proponcnts citc Locke's 
idea that property is "C01111110n to ali l11en." John Locke. The Secolld Trl!alise 01 COI'cn/lIl!.'III. ill POUIKAI 
WRIIII\GS OF JOHN LOCKf 2R3 (David Woolton cd .. 1(93) [hereinafter POI.ITlCA[ WRIII'I(iS [. 
68 SI!I!, cg.. Richard A. Epstein. Possessioll as Ihe Rool 01 Till£!. 13 (,A. L. Rcv. 1221, 1227 ( 1(79). 
69 See John Locke, Ti,e Secolld Trcalise oj COI'emlllelll. ill Two TIU·.AllsFs 01 G()\'l.RI\MFI\T 306 
(Peter Laslctt cd .• 19(0) ("Whatsoever then he rel110ves out of the State that Nature hath pro\'ided, and Icft it 
in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his own. and thereby makes it his 
Property."); see also POIlII( 'AI WRIII'J(iS, Slil'/'{/ note 67 ( "Iabour ... gave a right of property wherever anyone 
wa;, pica'icd to employ it upon what was eoml11on .... "). 
70 Locke. Illr example, believed that ali property \vas owned in eOl11mon, but that an individual's 
labor gave him a right to property. Husby. SllfJ/'{/ note 19 at 369 (citing (JUlR(ir S. ROBII\SO:-.J & HAROI.D M. 
WIIITr., ""VOl'S 01 M.\ '-'1<11\1) I X(, ( 19X6)). 
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appropriation does not have a damaging impact on the community as long as 
there IS "'enough and as good left in common for others. '''71 However, when 
there IS scarcity, the rights of the community against the individual become 
increasingly hostile. 
In outer space, scarcity will always be an Issue and thus will limit the 
utility of res comlllunis based on Lockean principles of property endowment.72 
The universe potentially may contain billions of solar systems and planets, but 
some celestial bodies may prove to be gold mines, while others prove to be "the 
Sahara."73 More important than the scarcity of limited resources, however, is the 
scarcity created by human lifespan and technological limitations. The time that 
space travel presently takes in comparison to the average human life span limits 
our ability to exploit celestial resources. Furthermore, technological limitations 
already have created issues of scarcity: such as the increasing problems of 
sate II ite positioning and traffic in geostationary orbit. N 
71 !d. at I22H (quoting JOII:-i Locn, BOOK II ~ 27 (3d cd. 196(,)); Richard A. Epstein, Th" ,'v/odel"ll 
U'I!S ojAlleiml rill\" 4S S.c. L. Rev. 243, 250 (1997). 
72 Id. at 12lS; see Joseph S. Spoerl, Thl! Social Respollsihililr ojBl/silli'ss, 4~ AM. J. JIIRIS. 277, nl 
(1997) (opining that '"given certain key ti:atures of the hU111an condition. such as li111ikd altruis111 and scarcity 
of rC~Ollrccs, it \VOlild be virtually itnpossibk to achieve widespread material prosperity for large numbers of 
people without pri,ate property and frec 111arkets"); Anupa111 (,hander & Madhavi Sunder. The HOl/lill/e" ojllll! 
[,,,hlic DOI/Illil/. 92 C'Vi, L. Rev. 1331, 1344 (2004) ('"Locke's labor theory of property depends upon the 
existence of a C0111111011S or public d0111ain of resources thllll which indiv iduals can !fecly take and 
appropriate,"). 
73 S rll'HlN HAWKIMi, A BRIEF HIS lORY OF TIMI:; FROM Ilil BI(i B'\N(i 10 BiACK HOLES 37 (1988); 
Paul Horowitz et aI., Thl! LillI' ,,(Prill/I! NIIII/hen, 6X N.Y.U, L Rev. 1 X5. I X9 (1993). 
74 Developing states, lacking the technological capahilities to produce satellites, arc concerned that 
their interests in space will be superseded by developed states. See, e.g" Francis Lyall, Posls alld 
Teh'colI/lI/l/Ilicaliol1s, in 2 UNITTJ) NAII()~S LUiAI OIWloR, 7X9, 796 xn (Oscar Schachter & Christopher C. 
./oyner cds. 1995); Milton L. Smith. The 5j}([ce Hill' COllcl"des, H3 A~L J. I" 1'1. L. 596 ( 19X'l), These concerns 
were partially addressed when each slale was allocated at least one geostationary orbi!. See M.\RK \V, J~~IS & 
./011" E. NOHS, l!';nRN~no'<AL LAW: CASeS A1\1l COMMI'NIARY 637 (2d cd. 20(1). For an excellent reviewal' 
scarcity in outer space and satellites, sec Copiz, sllpra note 16, at 216 223. 
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Property rights in outer space may become hotly contested if it is shown 
that there are enormous advantages, realizable profits, and limited resources. 
Thus, scarcity is an omnipresent threat and bar to the practical application of res 
commllllis ideology to space law. 7) 
Res communis presupposes that property is vested in the human 
community ah initio. Perhaps this idea resonates from the biblical Genesis, 
wherein God, on the sixth day, made humankind the beneficiary and governor of 
the earth.H' Thus, a res COl111llllilis philosophy applied to the corplisjuris ,Ipatialis 
would likely assume that all property in the entire universe belongs to the 
common heritage of humans. 
This assumption is dangerously close to the assumptions made by 
Westerners seeking to discover the Americas. They deemed Amerindians 
75 The Outer Space Treaty and Moon Treaty will not solve Locke's philosophical problem by 
redistributing the proceeds of the appropriated r"s /(lr thc bcncfit of humankind, bccause not cvery person will 
bcnefit from thc common heritage fillld. Additionally, thc themc of this criticism is against Locke's idca of 
property rights in a capitalist socicty which adhcrcs to strong thcmcs of privatization and individualislll. 
Thcrct,",c, the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Trcaty, although consistent with the principle of r('s CO/llllllUlis 
in it:-. distribution in some aspccls, <Irc incollsi~kl1t with the capitali~tic nature of ~ocicty today. 
76 Gel/esis 1:26 30 (King .lames). It reads: 
26. And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our 
likcness: and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea. and 
over the l(lWI of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, 
and over every creering thing that ereereth upon the earth. 
27. So God created man in his own image, in thc image of God 
created he him; male and female created he them. 
28. And God blessed thelll, and God said unto thelll, Be fj-uitli.i1, 
and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it: and have 
dominion over thc fish of the sea, and over thc fowl of the air, and 
over every li\·ing thing that 1l10vcth upon thc earth. 
29. And Ciod said, Behold, I have given you every herb bearing 
seed. which is upon the hIee of all the earth, and every tree, in the 
which is the li-uit of a tree yielding secd; to you it shall bc I(lr mcat. 
30. And to every beast of the earth, and to every fowl of the air, 
and to every thing that ereepeth upon the earth, wherein there is 
life. I have given every green herb Illr meat: and it was so. 
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inhabiting the land they "discovered" as incapable of holding fee because they 
wcre not "civilized" undcr Western standards.77 
If corpusjllris spatia/is incorporates the philosophy of lerra Ilullius, on 
the other hand, title contlicts could be avoided. Terra lIullius promotes the idea 
that land belongs to no one, until someone has mixed his or her labor with it.7x 
Thus, titlc acquisition for extraterrestrial regions would be determined by who is 
first to mix labor into the land, regardless of state or origin.79 
III. ABANDONING TilE OUTER SPACE TREAfY 
The Outer Space Treaty should be abandoned. Some signatory states may 
attempt to impose the obligations of the Outer Space Treaty on all states under 
the argument that it has become customary international law. The Outer Space 
Treaty's obligations, however, may be avoided in two ways. First, the Outer 
Space treaty could be nullified by demonstrating a fundamental change of 
circumstances that has arisen since the treaty's signing. Sccond, unilateral 
appropriation against the Outer Space Treaty's provIsIons may encourage 
widespread abandonment or consent to abandonment. 
77 SI!I! Johnson v. M'lntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (IX23) (explaining that ··the uniform understanding and 
practice of European nation", and the settled law, as laid down by the tribunals of civilized states, denied the 
right of the Indians to be considered as independent comlllunities, having a permanent property in the soil, 
capable ofalicnatioll to private individuals. They remain in a ~la1c of nature, and have never been adtnittcd into 
the general society of nations"). For general information of the treatment of Amerindians, see, RICIIARIl 
DRIM\ON, F~CI'I{i \\'I-SI: Till MLTAI'IIYSI{S Of 1!,;IJIAN-HAIIN{i ANIJ E\'II'IH-BlilllJl'I(i (1997): Roy H~R\'EY 
PEAR{E, SA\A{iISVI A1\f) ('IVILI/AIION: A SillilY 01 1m, INIlIA1\ A'I1l IIiL AVII,RI(AN MIND (199X): DAVID E, 
S J ·\NI\ARD, A\1LRI( '/\1'\ HOI O( 'A US r: C()LlJl\1Bll~ \N]) 1111', C()NC)t'l:S I 0]' IIII'. Nt,\\, WORL]) (1992)~ Rl ,SSFl L 
TIIOR" ION, A~lIcRI',\N 11\I)IA", 1101 OCAI" ANIl SI.R\WAI.: A P()I'LI AII()" HIs nlRY Sl~( I 1492 ( 1(90), 
7R SeC' gel/era III , P()I III'AI WRIIIN(iS, slIlml note (, 7, 
79 SI!C gCl/eralll' iii. 
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A. Fundamental Change in Circumstances 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) recognizes that 
states should not be bound by a treaty when there has been a fundamental change 
in circumstances. xo Aliicle 62 of the Vienna Convention explains the appropriate 
circumstances for states to terminate or withdraw from a treaty: 
A fundamental change of circumstances which has occuned with 
regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, 
and which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked 
as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty 
unless: (a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an 
essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the 
treaty; and (b) the effect of the change is radically to transform 
the extent of the obligations still to be perfonTIed under the 
treaty. 
States commonly regard this principle contained 111 the Vienna Convention as 
customary international law.xl 
This provision of the Vienna Convention has been tested in the 
International Court of Justice ("IC],,). In The Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros Project, the court acknowledged that a state could be released from 
its treaty obligations where there was a fundamental change in circumstances. x2 
However, it held that a state could not be released from its treaty obligations 
where the changes, fundamental or not, were foreseeable or where the purported 
change did not closely link to the purpose of the treaty. Xl Further, the court also 
RO Vicnna ("ol1\ention on the Law of Treatics. ()/wIled fiJI' sigll"{,,re May 23. 1969. art. 31. 1195 
U.N.TS. 331. X I.L.M. 679 Ihereinatier Vienna Convention I. 
XI See Gahcikovo-NagYll1aros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.). 19971.('.1.3 (Feh. 5). a\'(ii/ah/e ,,{ 1997 
WL 289957: see ,,/so 37 I.L.M. 162 ( 1998) (citing Fisheries ./urisdiction. 1.('..1. Reports 1973. at 63. para. 36). 
82 Ciabcikovo-NagY111aros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.). 1997 1.e..J. 3. 
83 !d. 
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concluded that a purportcd change must closely link to the purpose of the treaty; 
otherwise there could be no release from the treaty obligations. x4 
In Gabcikovo-NagYl1laros Project, Hungary sought to be released from 
its treaty obligation with Czechoslovakia. X) In 1977, the parties entered into the 
treaty to build a dam together and planned to benefit mutually from its 
construction. x6 In 1998, Hungary suspended its work on the dam citing environ-
mental concerns, and it unilaterally purported to terminate the treaty.X7 Hungary 
argued that circumstances had fundamentally changed sincc 1977, citing the 
dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the diminishing economic viability or the project, 
and the increased progress of environmental awareness and environmental 
treaties. xx The court held that the existing environmental knowledge in 1977 was 
sutIicient for the parties to have foreseen environmental dcvclopmcnts. x4 The 
court also asserted that one of the purported changes, the dissolution of 
Czechoslovakia, was not closely linked to the purpose of the treaty, which was 
dam building.911 Notably, the Vienna Convention did not explicitly bind Hungary 
and Czechoslovakia, yet the court held that article 62 codified customary interna-
tional law which in turn bound the paliics.'JI 
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Although foreseeability precluded Hungary from abandoning its treaty 
obligation in The Case Concerning the Cahcikovo-NagYl11aros Project, foresee-
ability would likely not preclude the parties to the Outer Space Treaty from doing 
so. Unlike Hungary, the parties to the Outer Space Treaty could not have foreseen 
the extent of the obligations and the nature of said consent. At the time of the 
treaty's signing, only governments conducted space activities; the privatization of 
outer space programs was virtually non-existent. Unlike Hungary's argument that 
the new circumstances rendered the project economically infeasible, commercial 
profit from space exploration did not exist during the ratification of the Outer 
Space Treaty and, therefore, remained outside the minds of the signatories. 
NASA, for example, was only nine years old when the Outer Space Treaty was 
formally presented in 1967.92 The United States government, as well as other 
nations with space programs, could not have understood or foreseen the impact 
of privatization and the decreased role states would occupy in outer space 
exploration and appropriation in the following decades. 
Indeed, what was on the minds of the contracting parties at the time they 
signed the Outer Space Treaty was winning the space race.'!J During the drafting 
of the Outer Space Treaty, the United States and the U.S.S.R. competed to 
demonstrate their technological and military superiority.94 Owing to this power 
struggle, the U.S.S.R. and the United States preferred to hurriedly acquiesce to 
92 See generally N;\S;\ History Division. http:;/history.nasa.gov! (noting that N;\S;\ was created in 
195X). The Ollter Space Treaty was open f()r signature in 1967. SCi! Outer Space Treaty, Slipi'll note 17. 
93 See Ty S. Twibell, Note, ,Sj}({ce Lilli" Legill Rl!slraillls Oil COIIIIIII!I'ciillbllioll illld DI!1·elojJIIII!III 
otOlller S/,iI(,l!. 65 UMKC L. Rf\,. 5R9, 599 (1997). 
94 SCI! gi!lll!ralir Risley. SII/,I'<I note 15. 
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the Outer Space Treaty rather than gamble on their own state's ability to reign 
supreme over outer space.9) Their ultimate goal, however, was domination of 
outer space appropriation through technological innovation; neither nation had 
any concern for the profitability of the venture. 
Certainly, the political conditions surrounding space appropriation have 
undergone a dramatic and fundamental change since the Outer Space Treaty was 
signed at the height of the Cold War. In nlct, that Cold War mentality-win the 
space race-is antithetical to the current nature of space appropriation. Now, in 
addition to national space agendas, the space race consists of private companies 
competing for prizes, such as the Ansari X Prize, and contracts from cell phone 
and tourism companies. 
The Moon Treaty illustrates the fundamental change in circumstances 
that has occurred since the signing of the Outer Space Treaty. The Moon Treaty 
borrowed and embellished the Outer Space Treaty's proviso from "province of all 
mankind" to "common heritage," but added spccificity.96 It failed to obtain 
sufficient signatures from developed states and the vast majority of developing 
states, including those who had signed the Outer Space Treaty just twelve years 
before. 97 
The fundamental change that occurred after the signing of the Outer 
Space Treaty was rapid technological advancement. Many signatories to the 
95 Si:i! iii; Fountain. SII/JnI note 45, at 1753 n,4 (citing Ezra.l. Rein,tein. Oll'llitlg OllieI' Sj}({ct', 20 
Nil . .I. '''T'L L. & BIIS. 59, 62 (1999)). 
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Outer Space Treaty had once doubted the cmerging possibilities of extraterrestrial 
colonization, lunar mineral appropriation, and militaristic outer space activitics. 9x 
However, during the time between the signing of the Outer Space Treaty and the 
"rejection" of the Moon Treaty, the United States landed on the lunar surface, 
developed more complex satellites, and contracted many of NASA's projects to 
private industry. In the face of these rapid technological advances, it could no 
longer commit to the Moon Treaty, even though it could have been seen as more 
of the same kind of promises made in the Outer Space Treaty. 
Another fundamental change in circumstances since the signing of the 
Outer Space Treaty is the shift of outer space appropriation and exploration from 
states to global corporations.99 Global corporations arc quickly becoming the new 
super power in outer space appropriation and exploration. Pecuniary incentives 
based on profitability and concerns of diminishing resources are likely to fuel 
technological advances in the space industry.loo These fundamental changes 
present new challenges to outer space appropriation which were non-existent 
when the Outer Space Treaty became effective. 
B. Unilateral Appl'Opriation againsl the OIL tel' Space Treaty 
In addition to a changc in fundamcntal circumstances, other mechanisms 
may induce the abandonment of the Outer Space Treaty. As previously discussed, 
the first mechanism for abandonment would simply involve developed and 
98 Twihcll. SIII)},lI note 93. at 59X. 
99 SCI.' COMMISSI()'1 RIP()RT. slIli/,{/ note 53.; Coren, SIIP/'{/ note 53. 
100 SCI!, e.g., Britt, SIII'/'{/ note 3; I'ilgill GlIllIc/ie, SIII'/'{/ notc 5; Malik. SIIP/'{/ notc 6. 
217 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW Spring 2005 
developing states mutually consenting to terminate the Outcr Space Treaty. 101 As 
an alternative to mutual consent, these states may also abandon the treaty in 
practice by simply appropriating cxtraterrestrial lands uni laterally, based on their 
reservations and interpretations of the Outer Space Treaty. If dctermined to be 
customary international law, the Outer Space Treaty may not permit these 
actions, but unilateral action may jumpstali extraterrestrial appropriation by other 
states. If enough states join in the appropriation, adversc adjudication may prove 
unlikely. 
IV. PROPOSALS FOR CELESTIAL ApPROPRIATION 
CUlTent approaches attempt to reform the existing corpllsj/lris ,\jultialis 
by either working within thc confines of a res cOl11l11unis framework or by 
creating cntirely new bodies of regulatory authority. These approaches are 
insufficient because they do not provide enough compensation or incentive to 
private enterprises and states. Despite the laudable and widely discussed attempts 
at reform within the existing framework of CHM principles, theorists are unable 
to provide effective solutions that compensate for market pressures and human 
self interest. 
Thus, states should abandon the Outer Spacc Trcaty and Moon Treaty in 
favor of a free-market approach based on traditional property jurisprudence 
which acknowledges and utilizes the capitalistic nature of modern economies. 102 
101 See Ty S. Twibcll, Note & ('omment, CirClIIIIII{/I'igOlillg IlIlel'llllliollo/ Sj}(lce LIl)\', 4 ILSA J. 
I~ 1'1.. & ('mIl'. L. 259, 292 (1')97). 
102 C( Hrandon C. Gruncr, Comment, ANn\' flopi' fiJI' IlIlemaliolla/ Space LOll': Illcorporalillg 
A'illetccl1th Ceil/lilY First Possession Principle,l; 111/0 ,//(! IlJo7 S'Pll(,(! n'C{/ly lor the C%l1i:::alioll (~r()lIt(!r SI}(Jcr! 
ill Ihe Tm!lIll'-Firsl Cenlllr\,. 35 Seton Hall L. Rcv. ~l)9 (2004) (proposing the implcmcntation of a property 
rights-based system that relics on thc doctrinc of tirst posscssion to govcrn cxtratcrrcslrial appropriation and 
arguing for the reemergence of nineteenth century first possession doclrinc~, ~lalutes, and case la\v to govcrn 
the colonization of outcr spacc). 
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This jurisprudence is the most practicable solution because it has guided human 
acquisition of property for millennia. Traditional property jurisprudence would 
allow all states to actively participate in an outer space market by grant of charter. 
Laws basing the acquisition of extraterrestrial property on (I) discovery; (2) 
claim; and (3) possession would best facilitate and encourage outer spaee 
appropriation and exploration. 
A. The Age ()IDis('ovel~\' ([nd the Age oj'Space Exploration 
States should abandon the Outer Space Treaty and Moon Treaty in favor 
of a free-market approach to space law based on traditional property jurispru-
dence. A capitalist approach to acquisition in outer space, such as the one 
evidenced in the Americas during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, would 
accommodate the nature of humankind that has evidenced itself for millennia, 
incorporating the components of human nature in an orderly, cquitable manner. 
Thc most compelling property right recognized by traditional property jurispru-
dence, as applied to outer space, is acquisition by discovery. This method of 
acquisition contains three distinct phases: (I) discovery; (2) claim; and (3) 
possession. Discovery and claim create an inchoate title which is perfected by 
possessIOn. 
1. Di.s'covelY 
The most appropriate analogy to outer space appropriation IS the 
discovery of the New World in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries because, 
much like Outer Space, the world was open to appropriation. Europeans based 
their appropriation of the New World on the doctrine of acquisition by discovery. 
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Under this doctrine, the discovery process began when a state granted a charter 
to a juridical or natural person. 1m The ehatier allowed the grantee to claim land 
in the name of the grantor state and entitled the grantee to certain contractual 
benefits and obligations pursuant to the provisions of the eharter. I()4 This analogy 
appropriately accommodates for the inevitable changes in cUlTent environmental 
and humanitarian concerns, as well as the expected advancement of developing 
states. lOS 
The Roman maxim: "Qui prior esl tempore pOlioI' esl jure," ("Who is 
first in point of time is stronger in right.") established a basic concept in the 
doctrine of acquisition by discovery.loc, From this concept developed one of the 
1110st basic rules of property law: acquisition by capture and original 
possession.I07 As a general principle, the first person who discovers a resource is 
entitled thereto. lOS In short, no sovereignty may be exerted over property unless 
the propeliy is discovered by the sovereign or its agents. 
When the Europeans discovered the Americas, countries eagerly laid 
claim to and appropriated as much land as they could acquire. 1m A sovereign 
entity granted a charter to companies and endowed them with power to act on 
I 03 S~(' Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 ( I K32). 
104 S('(' id. 
105 The Age of Discovery was a horrendous time It)r the indigenolls peoples thai inhabited the 
Americas, India, and Ali-ica. One of the harshest criticism, 01 the Age of Discovery and the property rules 
pertaining thereto is the devastation leveled on native peoples by overzealous discoverers and sovereigns who 
considered the nativc~ non-posscssor~ of the land due to their perceived migratory living. Because the native 
peoples were incorrectly considered non-po"cssors, the land was deemed as lal'll II II Ifill.l . S('(' Johnson v. 
M'lntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (IX23). 
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107 It!. 
10K SCI' Johnson v. M' Intosh. 21 U.S. 543 ( I X23). 
109 Id at 572 73. 
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bchalf of thc sovcrcign statc to claim tcrritory in cxchangc for taxcs paid on thc 
companies' profits. I 10 In order to avoid conflicts with other states, a principle was 
establishcd that "discovery gave title to the government by whose ... authority, 
it was made, against all other European governments, whieh title might be 
consummated by possession. "III States acquired title by vicarious discovcry 
when one of their subjects or chartered companies discovered new territories. II 2 
This well-established law in propel1y jumpstarted land discovery in the 
Americas because vast stretches of land were not owned, especially in Central 
Amcrica.1J1 In England, as carly as 1496, thc quccn grantcd a commission to John 
Cabot, allowing him to search for unknown countries. 114 Two years thereafter, 
Cabot discovered what is now known as the North American continent. 115 The 
English traced their title from Cabot's grant to his discovery.1I6 Henry Hudson, 
who sailed under the flag of Holland with orders from the East India Company, 
discovered lands from the Delaware to the Hudson, whereby Holland claimed by 
discovery that new country called "New Netherlands."117 Spain, although granted 
title by the Pope, also claimed title in the Americas by rights of discovery.llx 
II () s~~ Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (I R32) 
III Id. 
112 III. 
113 The llrl'vai ling thought in the Age of Discovery and during the several hundred years t(,IIowing 
insisted that the Amerindians were nol owners of land due to their migratOlY patterns and purported heathen 
nature. Although the author disagrees \vith this axiom. the author specifically addresses the perception of the 
colonizers and exploiters during the Age of Discovery. See Johnson. 21 U.S. at 572 ·73. 
114 See iii. 
115/d. 
1161d. 
117 Id. 
II RId. 
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Likewise, France claimed Louisiana and parts of Canada based upon acquisition 
by discovery.119 
The Europeans acquired their rights to discovered propcI1y vis-a-vis the 
right of the crown in granting the charter, and the grantee's ability to discover and 
possess the land. 120 Thus, in equitable tenns, the discoverer's exertion rewarded 
the sovereignty and the discoverer with vested title. Explorers endured great risks 
and hardships when they sailed across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans to look for 
discoverable lands; thus, they were entitled to some benefiLI21 Not only did they 
risk large amounts of capital, but they also risked their lives in these voyages 
fraught with unfortunate demise and plunderY'2 
Outcr space exploration and appropriation should apply this traditional 
rule of discovery because it rewards the states and entities who are willing and 
able to take the risks and hardships assoeiated with such activities. This construct 
appeals to basic ideas of fair dealing. For example, if company A seeks to place 
a hotel on Mars, then company A would be required to seek a charter from a state. 
When company A discovers the extraterrestrial region upon its arrival, it would 
claim the territory in the name of the granting state. The state would then own the 
extraterrestrial region in fee; and pursuant to its charter, the state would convey 
its interest, in fee or term of years, to company A in full or portion thereof. 
119 Iii. 
12() !d. 
121 See. e.g .. L.\l.R!N("L H!!H;R!!·N. OnR I!!! L!)(d O! I!!! WORlD: M~(d!! .\!';', TLRKUYIM; 
C!R("lI\I!,;AVI(,,\[!ON O! !!!I Ci! OH!' (20()3); M!u, II. D(WHNlN, CO! III,HllIS T!!us \\JD NO\\' /\ Lu! R!o! "A\I!NU) 
193 466 (1997); RONAW H. I'RIIL, NI:\\" WOH!>S: Till' (jl{l AI VmA<dS 01 [)[:,(()\I RY 140()·160() (2002). 
122 See, e.g., I:31R(;RI:I:N, SIII'/'(/ not~ 121; DA\'IIlSON, slIl'ra not~ 121, at 193 466; FRI It, slIl'ra note 
121. 
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Company A would perform its exploitation activities (hostelry) pursuant to the 
guidelines of the charter and be subject to the power of the granting state. 
States would freely negotiate multilateral or bilateral treaties with other 
states concerning established norms for granting charters. A state could 
preference a grant of charter upon the use of environmental procedures to limit 
the harm done to the celestial body. States may seek to limit the levels of 
appropriation, ensure safety procedures, provide dispute resolution with foreign 
companies, or define the limits of national appropriation pursuant to treaties with 
other states. 
The prImary problem with this system is the possibility of charter 
shopping. This is not an unrealistic concern given that charter shopping is 
common in the world today. For example, many island nations offer banking 
services that developed states would otherwise prohibit to persons of the 
developed state. Ie' Corporations actively seek states wherein they receive the 
greatest benefit for the least COSLI24 
Although private enterprises' state charter shopping has been seen as 
legitimate,125 such practices nonetheless catTY problematic effects. In order to 
produce income for their state, many developing states allow "open" registers 
123 See B. Chad Bungard. Offsilore HallAillg ill Iile Hrilisil Ihpelldel/cies, <) TOUR() Irq'l L. RF\·. 
141 (20t)!). 
124 For example, many corporations outsource to stntes with, inter alia, less stringent 
safety procedures or less cOlllpensntion. 
125 Shopping for statc charters. howcver. has been acknowlcdged as a legitimate maritime practice 
in international arbitration. In Tile Case oflile Mllseal f)ilo\l's, Britain questioned France's practice of allowing 
non-French states to usc thc French flag. See Frallce-Hrilaill. 19(}5. ill Till- HV(i1 rF ARRI I R·\rI()~ C.~srs 64 
(George G. Wilson cd., 1(15) Ihcrcinafkr Frallce-Brilai,l/. Britain was concerned by those states' suspected 
illegal slave trade and bccause a serics of British-French treaties limited Britain's rights to intercede in French 
matters. See JA'W, & NO'Ilcs, slIpra note 74, at (,52. In response to the British-French conflict, thc arbitrator 
expounded on the common rule: 
223 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW Spring 2005 
that do not require the vessel, its owner, or its erew, to have any connection with 
the registering state or even undergo periodic inspections.!26 
However, many of these concems about charter shopping could be 
placated if a genuine link is required between the granting state and the charter 
company. The Intemational Tribunal for the Law of the Sea acknowledged the 
legal significance of such a link in Saint Vincent (lnd the Grenadines I'. Guinea.127 
In that case the vessel Saiga flew the flag of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
and supplied fuel to fishing vessels in Guinea's exelusive economic zone.!2K A 
Guinean patrol vessel attacked the Saiga, and brought the vessel and its crew to 
Guinea.!29 The presiding tribunal required Guinea to pay compensation to Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines for excessive force. Ll0 Guinea contested paying 
compensation by asserting that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines did not have 
standing to submit their claims given that the vessel Saiga, and not the state, was 
the party harmed.!3! 
lGJenerally speaking Jthe right to tly a tlag over a vessel of a ditrerent sovereignty] 
belongs to every Sovcrcign to dccide to whol11 he will accord the right to tly his tlag and 
to prescribe the rules governing such grants ... therc!tll'c the granting of the French tlag 
to subjects of J another sovereign J in itself constitutes J a icgitimate exercise.J 
Fnlll('(:'-Britulll. 
126 I". at 6.19. Even though many corporations currently poised to explore outer space may reside 
and be incorporated in developed nations. those corporations could always di"oh'e and incorporate elsewhere 
in order to tind a charter in a state with the 10\\ cst fcc:-., in:-'lIfficicnt in:-.pcctioll and enforcement mechanisms. 
and a relative lack of procedural rcquisik:-. among other things. Ha\"ing potentially hazardous vessels acti\·cly 
cngaged in international COl11mercc without being requircd by their registering statc to takc sutlicient precau-
tions, may ultimatciy lead to an increased number of incidents. such as the Shctlands disaster. Additionally. the 
rcgistering statc or thc vessel's company may lack sutlicient resources to correct or mitigate the environmcntal 
dall1agc once problems occur. Sec Safer S'llIjJs, ('Iealler Seas, Rcport oj Lord f)ol1uldsol1:\ hU/Hir\' hllo the 
Prl!1'elllioll O/POlllllioll Fro II I MO'('//(/1I1 Shil'l'illg, CIll25hO (1994), a\ 1·+7. 
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Relying on The La\\' of" the Sca COf/l'cntion and the Convention of" the 
High Seas, the tribunal insisted that compensation was appropriate because of the 
genuine link between the vessel Saiga and the state ofSt. Vincent. 1,2 The tribunal 
found that a genuine link existed between the charter company and the granting 
state based on a series of factors. These factors include the following: (I) the state 
had signed and ratified treaties that rcgulated high sea vessels; (2) the state had 
established regular protocols and procedures for the inspection of the company's 
vessels; (3) the company had incorporated the vessel in the state; (4) the state had 
made vigorous efforts to secure the protcction of thc company's vessel; and (5) 
thc statc had given preference to its nationals to allow the flying of its flag. I" 
The factors on which the tribunal in Saint Vincent rested its decision 
should dispositively apply to whether a private enterprise may receive a grant 
from a state to appropriate extraterrestrial regions and travel into outer space. 
Private enterprise would not be as tempted to obtain a charter from any particular 
state because it would know that, without a genuine link between itself and the 
charter granting state, any activities it performed vicariously for that state would 
be invalid. Additionally, a charter-granting state would feel more confident in 
offering the private enterprise its protection because it would know that it has 
standing in international forums to handle disputes or recover damages 
associated with that enterprise. Developing states would be free to contract with 
private enterprises competitively as long as a genuine link existed to establish 
1.1~ '"There 1l11,,1 nisi a genuine link belween the State and thc ship; in particular. the State must 
efkctively exercise its jurisdiction and control in adl!1inistratilonl. technical and social matters over ships flying 
its flags." !d. 
133 fd. at para. 7S. 
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minimum administrative control over the private enterprise's appropriation 
activities. These administrative controls would ensure both environmental and 
safety standards, but would not be so overbearing as to completely strip away 
bargaining power from the developing state. The same process, convention 
signing and ratification, would expedite the implementation of the rule presented 
in Saint Vincent. 
In addition to the foregoing, other actions may be taken to prevent 
charter shopping. The United States and other developed states could effectively 
encourage and coerce developing states into multilateral and bilateral agreements 
that protect the environment and ensure safety procedures. This coercion would 
result from threats to levy sanctions on trade or withhold loans, aid, and grants. 
Furthermore, states may bar the import of products from a corporation incorpo-
rated in a rogue state that docs not meet certain requirements. Although corpora-
tions typically choose their localities based on contractual benefits and resultant 
cost and profit projections, other factors might persuade corporations to gain a 
charter from a developed state including military protection, education of 
populace, stability of govemment, tort and contract law protections, power and 
int1uenee in the intemational community, established and uniform system of 
jurisprudence, industrial infrastructure, transportation infrastructure, availability 
of natural resources, sanctions placed against the charter granting state, and 
locality. For example, many United States' citizens who seck to experience outer 
space as tourists may decline services offered by developing states that do not 
have the same characteristic safety mechanisms, tort law, and convenience of a 
226 
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developed state. On the other hand, some tourists may seck the least expensive 
services despite the increased risks. 
The charter system is not perfect. Inevitably, this system will create 
injustices to some and undue compensation to others. However, this traditionalist 
approach will provide a body of space law that encourages humankind to explore 
and appropriate celestial bodies. It will do so because it will operate under the 
system upon which the majority of the world already relics today: a market 
economy based on traditional property jurisprudence. 
The charter system will have the added benefit of propelling dcveloping 
states into space exploration as corporations take advantage of their charters. 
Developing states will have the opportunity to participate in the appropriation of 
outer space by their extension of natural and juridical persons into outer space. In 
this manner, developing states wi 11 enjoy increased territories, increased jobs for 
their populace, increased availability of appropriated materials, and increased tax 
revenues from appropriation activities. Instead of receiving indirect funds under 
the common heritage, developing states will become active participants in a 
market economy based upon the posturing of their contracts. Developing states 
would not be required to invest heavily in aerospace technologies because 
juridical persons would bring those technologies to the developing states. This 
system would increase competition and jumpstart space appropriation activities 
for all countries. Both developing and developed states would actively compete 
and appeal to corporations based upon the corporation's objectives and the state's 
interests. 
227 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW Spring 2005 
This approach has many bencfits over the corpllsjllris spatia/is and other 
alternative theories: 
I. Companies could pre-negotiate the terms of the charter 
with the granting state, creating security for the 
Company who would know what sort of revenues it 
must raise and sustain to make the enterprise a success. 
2. Companies would be granted a secure interest in the 
extraterrestrial region, which would facilitatc 
invcstment. 
3. States would widen their boundaries while providing no 
capital. 
4. States would realize pecuniary funds derived from 
appropriation activities via taxes. 
5. States would have increased resources from the 
appropriated materials. 
6. States could ensure environmental protection by 
multilateral and bilateral conventions, as well as 
contractual posturing in the granting of a charter to a 
company. 
7. The system would utilize current systems of government 
and would not require creation of new international 
legislative bodies. 
8. States would maintain their own sovereign entity and 
could not be superseded by an international regime. 
9. Granting of charter would be a fact specific contract that 
would allow workable solutions pursuant to the specific 
needs of the company and the concerns of the state. 
10. The system would be based on commonly recognized 
principles of capitalism and a free market economy. 
Admittedly, the di fference between past and present day technology 
would create a problem with a discovery approach based on principles of 
appropriation from the l500s and 1600s. In the Age of Discovcry, the confines of 
sight and mapmaking abilities limited discovery due to crude instrumentality as 
compared to today's satellite eapabilities.134 In contrast, our sense of sight can be 
) 34 COlI/jJ(/re BIHlCI R. EI)l RI, )" I ROlll:Cl 1('" ro SAil 1.11 II. C()~I~111NICMI(lN (2<1 cd. ) 9(9), alld 
Cml\1L:NIC,\TIOi\S S.\],FI.I.III, SVSIH1S: A'i O\'lR\II'\\' III 1111' TnIINOIO(,y IR.G. Gould and Y. F. LU111 cds .. 
) 976), \I'itll .lOll" H. H~LI:, A(d or Expi OR lTiO\! 73 94 I) 977), (///(/ GIINS, SAil s,\I'm )'\lpIRIS: TIl'II'WI ()(dCAI. 
h~O\'AIIO~ & Till EARl V PIIASIS or 1'11ROl'h\;; I;'I'.\NSI"" 1400-1700 119(,)) 1 heleinafter (,I :;;', S\II S ·1'1l 
hll'lRl.sl· 
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extended far beyond the reaches of this galaxy through the usc of modem 
technology. Our current map making instruments far exeeed the crude instru-
ments used by Columbus and Magellan. 1l5 From a literalist approach, humankind 
could own millions of light years of outer space just because they "saw" it 
through some sort of sophisticated technology. If states applied the appropriation 
principles of the Age of Discovery without any modification, they could merely 
invest in telescopic technology and capture vast solar systems as their own. This 
idea seems repugnant to fair dealing because it would allow a state a right to 
appropriate vast solar systems with minimal exertion. 
The essential principles of discovery would not be diminished if modifi-
cations or limits were made regarding the permissible use of sight-enhancing 
technology in the diseovery of outer space. The most crucial aspect of discovery 
docs not rely on the ability of the senses at any given point in history; instead, it 
relies on the utilization of those senses in a perilous and laborious manner. The 
underlying principle of acquisition by discovery rests on the laboriousness of the 
effort and peril of the voyage. Finding an object in outer space by use of a 
telescope or other sense enhancing mechanism docs not entail significant risk of 
life or loss of chattel. Although laborious in many instances, such procedures are 
not analogous to Columbus' efforts to sail across the ocean in search of new land 
and they should not endow the user with a vested interest in fee. 
In the context of extraterrestrial appropriation, in order for an entity to 
discover land, current space law should require that the discoverer ambulate and 
135 S"" Gtl\s. S,\II S Arm 1;\II'IRFs. ,I'llI'm note 134: BI.R(;RH~. ,I'llI'm note 121: D,wlf)so". ,I'llI'm 
note 121. at 193 466: FRII /. ,I'll/,m note 121. 
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physically stake a claim upon the extraterrestrial regIOn because ambulation 
entails signifieant labor and peril. This sort of space exploration is necessarily 
laborious and fraught with risk. Consider scientists who have dedicated 
themselves to aerospace engineering, aerospace construction, astronomy, and 
other diseiplines to hclp in the design of a space shuttle. Astronauts train many 
years before they can maneuver and fly a space craft. The space program is very 
expensive and requires a vast amount of resources. m Death occurs often in the 
space industry, as the families of the crew on the Challenger and Columbia can 
testify.137 Given its laborious and risky nature, discovery of celestial bodies is 
well suited for subjection to the same traditional property jurisprudence used by 
discoverers centuries ago. 
2. Claim 
Discovery of propelty does not by its very nature make it property of the 
statc. In order for a state to gain title to land, it must make a claim. Declaration 
of title, through the making of a claim, puts everyone in the whole world on 
notice that celtain propelty belongs to a certain state. 
In France v. United Kingdom, the International Court of Justice (lC]) 
declared that the making of a claim, along with other appropriation activities, 
established a state's sovereignty over land.l3x In this case, the ICJ had to decide 
whether groups of islets and rocks between the British island of Jersey and the 
136 Sl'l' C()\l~llSSl()N RU'()Rl, slIl'ra note 54; Coren, SlIl)J"1I note 54. 
137 Transcript, () Xl'ell'. ".1 hllgic /Jill' Ii,,' (!u! N,ISA Flllllilr. "CNN.l()~t, Feb. 2, 2003, lI\'(filllhle 
a{ http;//www.cnn.comi2003lTI.CH/space/02 .. Olishl1ttle.nasa.transcriptiindex.html(last visited Apr. 13,20(5). 
13X Minql1icrs and Ecrchos Case (Fr. v. U.K.), 1953I.C..I. 47 (Nov. 17). 
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coast of Francc wcre subject to the sovereignty of France or England. Ll9 The 
court reviewed numerous treaties and grants in those islands spanning the 
thirteenth century to the nineteenth century. I·j() In this review the court noted that 
France, in its notes and charters, had not included particular islands as their 
telTitory, whereas the British had. 141 The court found that this official inclusion, 
as well as other continual appropriation activities, was a "clear manifestation of 
British sovereignty."14c In short, Britain owned the islands because it had claimed 
ownership to them and asserted state authority while France had not. 
A state must clearly manifest intent to makc a claim for that claim to be 
valid. In the Advisory Opinion of the Westel11 Sahara, the IeJ concluded that 
Spain had not made a proper claim of sovereignty over Westel11 Sahara because 
it had merely expressed agreement to protect the land, rather than claim actual 
ownership of it. 14 ' In his Royal Order of 1884, the King of Spain had only 
declared that he had taken the Rio de Oro under his protection based upon 
agreements entered into with the chiefs of local tribes. 144 The King never clearly 
manifested a claim of ownership. 
In order for a state to own a celestial body or extratelTestrial regions, the 
state should be required to make a clearly manifest claim. The state should put 
the rest of the world on notice that the state believes it owns the property. ffother 
139 !d. at .:IX. 
140!d. at 50. 
141 Id.at47.51.6h. 
1.:12 Id. at t\h. 
143 Advisory Opinion on thc Westcrn Sahara (Spain v. Morocco), 19751.('..1. 12 (Oct. 16), para. RI. 
144 1d. 
231 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW Spring 2005 
states disagree or competing claims arise, then those states could resolve those 
conflicts according to their bilateral or multilateral treaties or other available 
mechanisms. An implied claim should not sufficiently satisfy the claim 
requirement because it docs not clearly put the rest of the world on notice and 
would increase the number of competing claims to the same land. 
3. Possession: The Ac:t o/Appropriatio/l 
"Grabbing," a crude description of land acquisition and possessIOn, 
accurately describes the procedure for the final step in original possession.1 45 
Under customary international law and traditional property jurisprudence, 
discovery and claim establish an inchoate title; possession perfects title thereto. 146 
The discovery of a body of land and laying claim thereto arc insufficient actions 
for entitlement and ownership of land. 147 The discoverer must take possession 
thereof. 14S 
145 DliKf\Il:-1ll'R, sllpra note 106, at 4 (quotlllg RIlII.\IW SCfIl ,\lIIR, PRIVAI L PIW"LRI y: Tile 
HISIORym AN Im'A 13031 (1951)). 
146 Sec T. O. Elias, The /Joctrille of IlItatelll/JOra/ lAlli', 74 AM. J. IN!'L L. 285, 2XX (1980); 
Seokwoo Lee. COlltilluing ReICl'(///ce of Traditiollal '''todes of Territorial //c'lliisitioll ill In/ema/iollal Lall' (111£1 
(I Modest Proposal, 16 Cmm. J. INT'I L. 1,3 (2000); Risley, SliP/,£! note 15, at 5-1; Nicolas J. Watkins. C0111111ent, 
Displlt£'d Sm·l!r£'igllt,· ill til£' Falklalld Islallds: The .llgell/illa-Great Bri/aill ('Oll/tiel of /1)8], II F! A. S I. U. L. 
R[\. 649, 661 62 (1983). 
147 Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.V. Sup. Ct. 18(5). Applicable by analogy, this tlullOUS case 
made clear that a property right in animab can be acquired only by po"ession. In particular, the court noted 
that animals tlJllnd in nature belong to no one. Thus, while a hunter may have first discovered and be in pursuit 
of an animal, he or she docs not own it nor have a right to it. Possession of lhe animal gives the hunter the 
ownership right over the animal, regardless of prior discovcry. 
14X Commentators have suggested: 
Now property 0\\ nership was introduced t(lr the purpose of presel'\ing equality to this end. in tlld, 
that each should enjoy his own. But what is this "own" to which each man has an equal right') ... In Llet, the 
"0\\ n" which the laws of property protect i~ \\ hatc\'cr an individual has managed to get hold of, and equality of 
right. applied to property, means only that e\'ery man has an equal right to grab. The institution of property was 
an agreement among mcn legalizing what each had already grabbed, wJlhout any right to do so, and granting, 
for the future, a formal right of ownership to the first grabber. [)\JKI;\t\t\lIc~, SIIJlI'£I note 106, at 4 (quoting 
RICHARD SCHLAlII.R, P~I\,\TE PRO"I-.I(!Y: Till' HISIORY OF AN IIJf'\ 130 131 (1951)). 
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Additionally, a state must possess or occupy its discovered and claimed 
land effectively. Effective possession requires the sovereign to secure "its 
position and continually pcrform symbolic acts to indicate its legitimate authority 
over that territory. "149 In other words, the sovereign must act like a sovereign and 
perfonn the types of acts that sovereigns typically perform. 
The requirement of possession through actual or symbolic sovereign acts 
has been upheld in the lI-1and ojPa/mos Case. 150 In that case, the Netherlands and 
the United States both laid competing claims to the Islands of Palmas. lsi Spain 
had discovered and laid claim to the islands in the 1500s,152 and subsequently 
ceded them to the United States in I R9R. 153 In the meantime, the Netherlands had 
concluded contracts with local rulers, taxed the inhabitants, patrolled the islands 
during the Spanish-American War, and provided relief to the island after a 
typhoon in 1904; the Netherlands had effectively possessed Palmas.154 
Due to these continual and peaceful displays of state authority, the 
arbitrator concluded that under customary international law, Netherlands' title 
superseded the United States' inchoate title based upon mere discovery and 
claim.155 The arbitrator reaffirmed that discovery without actual or symbolic acts 
does not perfect title but merely creates an inchoate title. IS!> Although possession 
149 Risley. SIII'/"{/ no Ie 15. 
150 Island of Pal111as Case (U.S. v. Neill.). 2 R.I.A.A. 829. 835 36 (1928). 
151 Id 
152 I". at X44. 
153 Id. at X42. 
154 Id at 870. 
155 Id. at X70 71. 
156 Id at 867. 
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of the territory docs not require exercise of power everywhere and at every time, 
the possession must be ctTectivc. I ';7 
Title should vest in the same manner for extratelTestrial regions 
as it does under customary international law. Once a state, unilaterally or by 
chmier, has discovered and claimed land, the state should be required to 
"possess" the territory. Possession should include physical manifestations and 
symbolie aets consistent with state sovereignty. These acts could include enacting 
municipal laws, appointing administrators, levying taxes, providing eivil dispute 
resolution, providing protection from hostile forces, excluding non-citizens, and 
other exercises of poliee, administrative, and judicial authority. Although these 
manifestations need not occur at every moment and in every region of the 
claimed land, they must occur definitively over a prescriptive period. Once 
manifestations of sovereignty occur over the prescriptive period, inchoate title 
would be perfected, and the state would become a bona fidc owner. 
This approach based on principles of customary international law and 
traditional property jurisprudence has many benefits over the current COIpltsjllris 
.\patialis. A new cO/pus juris "]Ja{ialis should encourage states to govern their 
persons in an orderly manner to obtain vested title. This uniform manner of 
acquisition would appeal to the world market economy and independent 
sovereign states who wish to appropriate extraterrestrial regions. The new corpus 
juris spatialis would not require governmental agencies to exercise minute and 
exeessive control, thereby reducing administrative costs of space exploration and 
157 Id. 
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appropriation. Each state would determine, according to its particular needs, the 
amount of power that it should exercise, as long as the state manifests definitive, 
sovereign acts. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Extraterrestrial appropriation no longer remains the exclusive domain of 
the state. Private enterprise and its technological advances have changed widely 
held paradigms regarding the function and destiny of outer space. This shift is a 
result of the ever-increasing potential for private profit. 
The current corpus juris spa/ialis, largely contained in the Outer Space 
Treaty, conflicts with the idea of private enterprise and actually decreases the 
likelihood of space exploration and usc. The common heritage of mankind 
principle, underlying this treaty, is based on a res cOl11/11unis theory, which is 
antithetical to current economic stimuli and ignores a fundamental desire of 
human beings to reap the benefit of the labor they exert. At the time the Outer 
Space Treaty was signed, states could not appreciate the opportunities extrater-
restrial appropriation would entail and the degree of private participation therein. 
Given the fundamental changes in technology as well as the changes in political 
and economic climates, this treaty, and others like it, should be abandoned. 
Traditional property jurisprudence would make the best foundation for a 
new Co/pllS juris spa/ialis. States should establish new territories in space 
pursuant to established principles of property jurisprudence: discovery, claim, 
and possession. This discovery of celestial bodies should be guided by a charter 
system similar to that used in the Age of Discovery. This system should be 
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premised on current ideals of property distribution and ensure sutTicient 
regulation to maintain a harmonious society. 
Ultimately, the issue is whether traditional property jurisprudence is the 
best method for regulating and prompting the venture outside the confines of 
earth. Of course, just as the current capitalist regime is not perfect, problems with 
following traditional propeliy jurisprudence in outer space will inevitably arise. 
However, a corpus juris spatia/is based on traditional property jurisprudence is 
the best alternative for regulating outer space appropriation. 
JOllathull Thomas* 
* The author would like to thank Professor Christopher Roederer for his criticisms and suggestions. 
236 
• 
